,个人简历
1997年-2005年 加州大学洛杉矶分校经济系助理教授
2000年-2001年 耶鲁大学经济系访问助理教授
2005年- 北京大学光华管理学院教授
2010年- 北京大学光华管理学院院长
研究领域
中国经济、产业组织、博弈论、公司金融
教育背景
1988年 武汉大学数学学士
1991年 北京大学经济学硕士
1997年 斯坦福大学经济学博士
1997年 斯坦福大学统计学硕士
学术兼职
全国人大代表
北京市政协委员
民盟中央经济委员会副主任以及民盟北京市副主委
国家审计署特约审计员
中国联通公司独立董事
中国石化集团外部董事
社会荣誉
2006年 获教育部新世纪优秀人才称号。
2007年 获国家自然科学杰出青年科学基金。
2008年 被聘为教育部长江学者特聘教授。
2011年 当选为世界计量经济学会会士（Fellow），并于2012年被选为理事会理事。
研究成果
外文期刊文章（Publications in International Journals）:
[1] “Bargaining on Behalf of a Constituency”,2000, Journal of Economic Theory, 92:234-273.
[2] “Delay in Multilateral Bargaining under Complete Information”,2000, Journal of Economic Theory, 93:260-276.
[3] “Capital Budgeting and Compensation with Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard”, with Antonio Bernardo and Jiang Luo, 2001, Journal of Financial Economics, 61:311-344.
[4] “A Theory of Joint Asset Ownership”, 2003, Rand Journal of Economics, 34:62-76.
[5] “Inefficient Markov Perfect Equilibria in Multilateral Bargaining”, 2003, Economic Theory, 22:583-606.
[6] “War or Peace”, 2003, Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy, Vol. 2: No. 1, Article 2. http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/contributions/vol2/iss1/art2.
[7] “State Corroding Federalism”, with Daniel Treisman, 2004, Journal of Public Economics, 88:819-843.
[8] “Capital Budgeting in Multidivisional Firms: Information, Agency and Incentives”, with Antonio Bernardo and Jiang Luo, 2004,Review of Financial Studies, 17: 739-767.
[9] “Agency Problems and Commitment in Delegated Bargaining”, with Walter Cont, 2004, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 13:703-729.
[10] “Does Competition for Capital Discipline Governments: Decentralization, Globalization and Public Policy”, with Daniel Treisman, 2005, American Economic Review, 95:817-830.
[11] “Incentive Compatible Collusion, Competition and Innovation”, with Uday Rajan, 2005, Annals of Economics and Finance, 6:37-52.
[12] “Over-communication in Strategic Information Transmission Games”, with Joseph Tao-Yi Wang, 2006, Games and Economic Behavior, 56:7-36.
[13] “Did Decentralization Cause China’s Economic Miracle?” with Daniel Treisman, 2006, World Politics, 58:505-535.
[14] “Reserve Price Signaling”, with John Riley and Lixin Ye, 2007, Journal of Economic Theory, 135:253-268.
[15] “Costly Participation and Heterogeneous Preferences in Informational Committees”, 2009, Rand Journal of Economics, 40:173-189.
[16] “Political Decentralization and Policy Experimentation”, with Daniel Treisman, 2009, Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 4:1-24.
[17] “Motivating Entrepreneurial Activity in a Firm,” with Antonio Bernardo and Jiang Luo, 2009, Review of Financial Studies, 22:1089-1118.
[18] “Firm Reputation and Horizontal Integration”, with Ichiro Obara, 2009, Rand Journal of Economics, 40:341-364.
[19] “Competition and Corporate Tax Avoidance: Evidence from Chinese Industrial Firms”，with Qiao Liu, 2009, Economic Journal, 119:764-795.
[20] “Observational Learning: Evidence from a Natural Randomized Field Experiment,” with Yuyu Chen and Hanming Fang, 2009,American Economic Review, 99:864-882.
[21] “Incentives, Equality and Contract Renegotiations: Theory and Evidence in the Chinese Banking Industry”, with Hongbin Li and Li-An Zhou, 2010, Journal of Industrial Economics, 58:156-189.
[22] “Income and Consumption Inequality in Urban China: 1992-2003”，with Yuyu Chen and Li-An Zhou, 2010, Economic Development and Culture Change, 58(3):385-413
[23] “Eat, Drink, Firms and Governments: An Investigation of Corruption from Entertainment Expenditures in Chinese Firms”, with Hanming Fang and Lixin Xu, 2011, Journal of Law and Economics, 54:55-78.
中文期刊文章（Publications in Chinese Journals）：
[1] “竞争会加剧公司隐瞒利润吗？－来自中国企业的证据”，蔡洪滨，刘俏，肖耿， 2006， 经济学报，2: 15-45.
[2] “中国企业信誉缺失的理论分析”，蔡洪滨，张琥，严旭阳，2006 (9)，经济研究，85-93。
[3] “宗族制度、商人信仰与商帮治理”，蔡洪滨，周黎安，吴意云，2008 （8），管理世界，87-99.
[4] “授权结构与激励的一些理论分析”，蔡洪滨，刘青，2008，经济学季刊，31:1-22.
[5] “寡头市场，递归信念与声誉”，杜创，蔡洪滨，2009，世界经济，372: 38-50.
[6] “差异产品市场上的声誉锦标赛”，杜创，蔡洪滨，2010 (7)，经济研究，507: 130-140.
[7] “策略性模糊在信息甄别中的作用”，吴应军，蔡洪滨，2011 (3)，经济研究516: 108-118.
Book Reviews:
[1] Book Review of “China’s Great Transformation” eds. Loren Brandt and Thomas G.Rawski, Economics Development and Cultural Changes, October 2010, 59: 234-240.
中文书中章节（Book Chapters in Chinese）
[1] “中国国有企业的技术进步：估计与分析”，录于《中国经济增长与波动》，厉以宁等编，1993。
Working Papers :
[1] “Microinsurance, Trust and Economic Development: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment,” with Yuyu Chen, Hanming Fang and Li-An Zhou. Submitted.
[2] “Family Ties and Organizational Design: Evidence from Chinese Private Firms”, with Hongbin Li, Albert Park and Li-An Zhou, revise and resubmit, Review of Economics and Statistics.
[3] “China’s Land Market Auctions: Evidence of Corruption?” with Vernon Henderson and Qinghua Zhang. Submitted.
[4] “Why Do Large Firms Willingly Pay Higher Wages in Developing Countries?”, with Miaojun Wang and Se Yan. Submitted.
[5] “Do Multinationals’ R&D Activities Stimulate Indigenous Entrepreneurship? Evidence from China’s ‘Silicon Valley’”, with Yasuyuki Todo and Li-An Zhou.
[6] “More Trusting, Less to Trust: Evidence from Eachnet.com,” with Ginger Z. Jin and Li-An Zhou.
[7] “Local Credibility Test”, with John Riley and Lixin Ye.
[8] “A Theory of Organizational Dynamics: Internal Politics and Efficiency”, with Hong Feng.
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